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Abstract—True random number generators (TRNGs) are es-
sential components of cryptographic designs, which are used to
generate private keys for encryption and authentication, and are
used in masking countermeasures. In this work, we present a
mechanism to design a stealthy parametric hardware Trojan for
a ring oscillator based TRNG architecture proposed by Yang et
al. at ISSCC 2014. Once the Trojan is triggered the malicious
TRNG generates predictable non-random outputs. Such a Trojan
does not require any additional logic (even a single gate) and is
purely based on subtle manipulations on the sub-transistor level.
The underlying concept is to disable the entropy source at high
temperature to trigger the Trojan, while ensuring that Trojan-
infected TRNG works correctly under normal conditions. We
show how an attack can be performed with the Trojan-infected
TRNG design in which the attacker uses a stochastic Markov
Chain model to predict its reduced-entropy outputs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptographic devices are those pieces of (usually) hardware
that implement cryptographic algorithm(s) providing different
aspects of security. Since such devices often deal with secret
information and/or privacy of the users, they are very attractive
target for subversion by malicious actors. Manipulating hard-
ware implementations as opposed to software implementations
can lead to cryptographic Trojans that are particularly difficult
to detect. Hardware Trojans have gained high attention in
academia and industry as well as government agencies, and
can leak the secrets in a particular fashion without the notice
of the end users.
Research concerning the Trojan design and Trojan detection
are large and active. Nevertheless, these two topics are closely
related. The effective detection mechanisms and countermea-
sures are only possible when there is an understanding of how
hardware Trojans can be built. Amongst several different ways
to insert a Trojan into an IC, we can refer to those conducted i)
by an untrusted semiconductor foundry during manufacturing,
ii) by the original hardware designer who is pressured by the
government bodies, and iii) in the third-party IP cores. Most of
the hardware Trojans are inserted by modifying a few gates (can
be done at different abstraction levels) [9], [7]. In short, one of
the main goals of the Trojans is to be designed/implemented
in such a way that the chance of detection becomes very low.
High entropy random numbers are very essential component
in many aspects of information security, which forms the
foundation for many cryptographic algorithms. Some common
applications are generating private keys, nonces, random
numbers in challenge response protocols, and random numbers
in side-channel leakage countermeasure implementations. One
of the most popular methods for generating random numbers is
sampling jittery signals generated by ring oscillators (ROs) [21]
and [6]. In this paper, we present a parametric hardware Trojan
for an RO-based TRNG presented in [21] in such a way that it
works correctly under normal environmental conditions, but it
produces non-random and predictable outputs at particular en-
vironmental conditions such as high environmental temperature.
Our Trojan does not require the addition of any additional logic
(even a single gate) to the design, making it extremely hard
to detect. More precisely, our technique injects a parametric
Trojan that can be triggered. Under normal conditions the
randomness of the TRNG output is not affected, which enables
the Trojan to avoid being detected by an evaluation lab. By
increasing the temperature of the subverted device (or by
increasing its workload) the Trojan is triggered and exhibits
non-random and periodic outputs. We show that by injecting
this Trojan, we are able to control the output of the TRNG. This
biasing significantly lowers the security level even of highly
protected crypto-core implementations rely on the TRNG. Also
we elaborate a stochastic model based on Markov Chains by
which the attacker’s knowledge enables predicting the output
of the Trojan infected TRNG.
Section II reviews related work in the areas of hardware
Trojans. Afterwards, in Section III we describe the ring-
oscillator-based TRNG architecture which is our target to
design the hardware Trojan. In Section IV we express our core
idea how to build and insert our Trojan into the ring-oscillator-
based TRNG. In Section V we explain how to elaborate a
stochastic model based on Markov Chain for the attacker’s
knowledge to predict the output of the Trojan infected TRNG.
In Section VI the measurement results are provided. Finally,
we conclude our work in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Malicious and intentional modification of integrated circuit
(IC) during manufacturing in untrusted foundry is an emerging
security concern. This problem exists because the majority
of ICs are fabricated abroad, and a government agency could
force a foundry to manipulate the design maliciously. Also, an
IC designer can be pressured by her own country government
to modify the ICs maliciously, e.g., those ICs that are used
in overseas products. Another possible insertion point are 3rd
party IP cores. In general, a hardware Trojan is a back-door
that can be inserted into an integrated circuit as an undesired
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and malicious modification, which makes the behavior of the
IC incorrect.
There are many ways to categorize Trojans such as categoriz-
ing based on physical characteristics, design phase, abstraction
level, location, triggering mechanism, and functionality. But a
common Trojan categorization is based on the activation mech-
anism (Trojan trigger) and the effect on the circuit functionality
(Trojan payload). A set of conditions that cause a Trojan to
be activated is called trigger. Trojans can combinationally or
sequentially be triggered. An attacker chooses a rare trigger
condition so that the Trojan would not be triggered during
conventional design-time verification and manufacturing test.
Sequentially-triggered Trojans (time bombs) are activated by
the occurrence of a rare sequence events, or after a period of
continuous operation [5].
The goal of the Trojan can be achieved by payload which can
change the circuit functionally or leak its secret information. In
[11] a categorization method according to how the payload of
a Trojan works has been defined; some Trojans after triggering,
propagate internal signals to output ports which can reveal
secret information to the attackers (explicit payload). Other
Trojans may make the circuit malfunction or destroy the whole
chip (implicit payload). Another categorization for actions of
hardware Trojans has been presented in [19], in which the
actions can be categorized into classes of modify functionality,
modify specification, leak information, and denial of service.
The work in [3] presented building stealthy Trojans at
the layout-level. A hardware Trojan was inserted into a
cryptographically-secure PRNG and into a side-channel re-
sistant Sbox by manipulating the dopant polarity of a few
registers. Building hardware Trojans that are triggered by aging
was presented in [17]. These Trojans only become active after
the IC has been working for a long time.
A class of hardware Trojans – Malicious Off-chip Leakage
Enabled by Side-channels (MOLES) – has been presented
in [13], which can retrieve secret information through side
channels. They formulated the mechanism and detection
methods of MOLES in theory and provided a verification
process for multi-bit key extractions. A parametric Trojan
has been introduced in [12] which triggers with a probability
increasing under reduced supply voltage. In [9] a design
methodology for building stealthy parametric hardware Trojans
and its application to Bug Attacks [4] has been proposed. The
Trojan is based on increasing delay of gates of a very rare-
sensitized path in a combinatorial circuit, such as an arithmetic
multiplier circuit. It is stealthy and has rare trigger conditions,
so that the faulty behavior of the circuit under attack only
occurs for very few combinations of the input vectors. Also
an attack on the ECDH key agreement protocol by this Trojan
has been presented in this work.
A physical attack on random number generators was pre-
sented in [15] which aims at an RO based TRNG implemented
in an IC. Injecting a sine wave onto the power supply, the
operating conditions were modified and a bias appeared at the
output signal. Another physical attack presented in [2], targets
another RO based TRNG [20] using an electromagnetic attack.
In this attack, the ROs were locked on the injection frequency,
generating a controllable bias at the output. The work in [16]
investigated the impact of power and clock glitches, temperature
and underpowering on a TRNG design [6] implemented on an
FPGA.
III. RING OSCILLATOR-BASED TRNG
We consider the true random number generator (TRNG)
design proposed in [21]. Figure 1 shows the TRNG architecture,
which is based on the collapse time of three racing edges in
a ring oscillator (RO). The design has two ring oscillators
(RO). The first one is a reference that operates as a standard
single-edge ring oscillator. The second one, which is called
3-edge RO, has three edges injected by three input nodes that
propagate through the ring together at the same time (Figure 2).
These edges in the 3-edge RO have same period, but they are
shifted 120◦ in phase. As a result of this the frequency of
the output of the 3-edge RO is boosted 3× in comparison to
the regular RO. There is an increasing variation of the pulse
width between edges in the 3-edge RO because of thermal
noise (jitter) that exists in the system. This variation in the
pulse widths causes neighboring edges to eventually collapse
in the 3-edge RO, after which there is only a single oscillation
in the ring. The collapse event in turn causes the 3-edge RO
to change to a typical 1x frequency mode as can be seen in
Figure 3. The time to collapse is used as the entropy source
for the TRNG.
Fig. 1: TRNG system block diagram [21]
Fig. 2: 3-edge ring oscillator
Phase frequency detector (PFD) module in the TRNG
architecture shown in Figure 1 is used to detect the edge
collapse events by comparing the frequencies of the regular
RO and the 3-edge RO. A 14-bit counter counts the number
of cycles until edge collapse event. This counter increments
on rising edges of the 3-edge RO.
The number of cycles to collapse follows inverse Gaussian
distribution caused by thermal noise. In this design effect of
process variation is canceled because all three edges propagate
through the same RO stages [18]. We need to extract uniformly
distributed random bits from collapse time. A simple method
which has been applied in TRNG designs [18], [14] is to take
the lower bits of the collapse count as output while the LSB
is dropped to eliminate sensitivity to mismatch in the counter
Fig. 3: Output waveforms of 3-edge RO (top) and regular RO
(bottom)
sampling flip-flop. In our work we consider COUNT [6 : 4]
as the TRNG random output bits.
IV. HARDWARE TROJAN RO-BASED TRNG
Our goal is to maliciously manipulate the TRNG design to
produce predictable outputs at a particular high environmental
temperature. The conditions that cause a transition from correct
behavior to Trojanized behavior should be available and known
only to the Trojan attacker. In order to trigger the Trojan, the
attacker must apply the specific temperature which could for
example be beyond the maximum operating temperature of the
device.
To realize such a scenario – inspired from the stealthy
parametric Trojan introduced in [9] – we intentionally lengthen
a certain path of a combinatorial circuit. This is done in such
a way that by increasing the device’s temperature, a signal on
this path propagates slower than in normal operation. In the
3-edge RO construction, we achieve our goal of compromising
the entropy by delaying one of the three edges of the 3-edge
RO, which causes the RO to collapse in a few cycles with
negligible variation. This rapid collapse behavior is not useful
for generating random bits as it does not provide enough
entropy.
Our technique for causing the delay change is based on
manipulating one of the NAND gates that injects an edge to the
RO circuit in such a way that its propagation delay is increased
with temperature. The NAND gate must be very carefully
altered in such a way that its propagation delay becomes more
sensitive to the temperature variation than the other gates of
the 3-edge RO. Note that the functionality of the design is
unaltered during the normal environmental temperature.
In this work, we focus on manipulation of threshold voltage
and show how this can be used by an attacker to trigger
the Trojan at a specific operating temperature. To make the
propagation delay of the target NAND gate in the 3-edge RO
more sensitive to the temperature increases, we manipulate the
threshold voltages of its transistors and use a combination of
high VTH and low VTH transistors for its implementation.
A. Injecting temperature-triggered Trojan into RO-based TRNG
The time to collapse is used as the entropy source for random
number generation, and delaying the start of any edges will
cause the output to be not random. We focus on a single NAND
gate B shown in Figure 4. We realize the Trojan functionality
by increasing the delay sensitivity of the NAND gate B to
temperature increases without modifying the logic circuit. Edge
B is injected to the RO with delay when temperature increases,
so the neighboring edges of the edge B can reach it sooner
than in the unmodified circuit. As a result of this, we will have
a small time to collapse and hence reduced entropy.
We show in Figure 4 how we modify the transistor-level
implementation of the targeted NAND gate B to make it more
sensitive to the temperature. We use high threshold voltages
(high-VTH ) for the NMOS and PMOS transistors connected
to the start input, whose threshold voltages are increased
from their standard values. As a result of this, both modified
transistors will be slow to propagate the transitions on the start
input to the output of the NAND gate when the temperature
increases. Furthermore, to these two transistors more sensitive
to temperature than the other transistors, we use low threshold
voltages (low-VTH ) for the rest of the transistors in the circuit
so that their delay will not increased as much as these two
targeted transistors. Note that the amount of delay added to
the targeted NAND gate by the threshold voltage manipulation
is small in the regular environmental temperature and does
not affect the behavior of the 3-edge RO, so the malicious
modification is extremely difficult to detect.
Fig. 4: Threshold voltage manipulation of the 3-edge RO
As an example, we simulate the maliciously manipulated
3-edge RO design in two different environmental temperatures;
25◦C (as a normal environmental temperature), and 120◦C
(as an increased environmental temperature). The Trojanized
circuit behaves similar at 25◦C to the unmodified 3-edge RO
and there is a large collapse time (Figure 5(a)) which can be
used as a source of entropy for random number generation. At
120◦C, the behavior of the Trojanized circuit is changed and it
collapses in a few cycles (Figure 5(b)). The immediate collapse
occurs because the edge at NAND gate B in the manipulated
3-edge RO is not injected into the ring simultaneously with the
two other edges injected at A and C. The immediate collapse
behavior is not useful for extracting random bits and does not
provide enough entropy. This is how the proposed temperature-
triggered hardware Trojan removes the source of randomness
from the 3-edge RO when the temperature rises.
V. HOW TO PREDICT THE OUTPUT OF THE TROJAN TRNG
In this section, we describe how, in principle, an attack
on the Trojan infected random number generator can be
Fig. 5: Output waveform of the Trojan infected 3-edge RO at
(left) 25◦C where there is a large time to collapse, and (right)
120◦C where there is a very small time to collapse
executed. When an attacker wants to attack the TRNG, she
may choose the environment temperature and the input master
clock (MCLK) of the TRNG at her will. But even when
attacker knows the operating conditions of the TRNG, its
output bit-stream cannot be predicted perfectly, because of
existing jitter in the TRNG, which follows independent normal
distribution (N(0, σ2jitter)). We elaborate a stochastic model
for the attacker’s knowledge to predict the output of the Trojan
infected TRNG with a Markov chain model to describe the
probability of occurrence for different output sequences of the
Trojan infected TRNG.
A Markov chain is a stochastic model which describes a
sequence of possible events in which the probability of each
event depends only on the state in the previous event [8].
Assume we have a process with a set of states S = s1, s2, ..., sr.
The process starts in one of these states (initial state) and moves
from one state to another. If the process is in state si, then
it moves to state sj with a transition probability pij at the
next step , which is independent of states the chain was in
before. The transition probabilities of all possible transitions
in a Markov model can be shown by a matrix called transition
matrix. Let P be the transition matrix of a Markov chain. The
ijth entry p(n)ij of the matrix P
n gives the probability that the
Markov chain, starting in state si, will be in state sj after n
steps [10].
Our Trojan removes the entropy source of the manipulated
TRNG when temperature increases so that it behaves as a non-
random and predictable counter when temperature rises. For
example the TRNG counter value increments by approximately
130 in each clock cycle of 26ns. But there is variation in
the amount of count due to the jitter which follows a normal
distribution. For example, assume variance of jitter is σ=100,
Figure 6 shows the normal distribution of the jitter and the
values that the Trojan infected TRNG counts corresponding to
the jitter amount.
Transition matrix of the Trojan infected TRNG for seven
lower output bits is shown by Equation 1 where pij is the
transition probability that a TRNG output value which is
currently i will move to value j at the next step. For example,
p01 = 0.341 is the probability of TRNG output transition from
Fig. 6: Jitter effect on the Trojan infected TRNG counter values
0000000 to 0000001. If the current output value of the TRNG is
0000000, in order to have the value 0000001 as the next output,
the TRNG must increment its current value by 129 in the next
clock cycle, which happens with probability of 0.341 based on
Figure 6. As another example, consider p10 = 0.021 which is
the probability of TRNG output transition from 0000001, to
0000000. If the current output value of the TRNG is 0000001,
in order to have value 0000000 as the next value of the TRNG,
the TRNG must increment its count by 127, which happens
with probability 0.021 as shown in Figure 6.
P =

0000000 0000001 . . . 1111110 1111111
0000000 0.136 0.341 . . . 0.001 0.021
0000001 0.021 0.136 . . . 0.000 0.001
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
1111111 0.341 0.341 . . . 0.021 0.136

128∗128
(1)
The powers of the transition matrix of the Trojan infected
TRNG give the attacker interesting information about the
process as it evolves. She shall be particularly interested in the
state of the chain after a large number of steps. For example,
consider a scenario in which the TRNG output is used to
produce a 15-bit secret key for a crypto system. Guessing this
15-bit secret key with certainty through brute force requires
trying 215 possible values for the key. An attacker that knows
the properties of the output pattern of the Trojan infected
TRNG, which are represented by the transition matrix and
power matrices of the Trojan infected TRNG, can have an
enhanced ability to predict output sequences.
The attacker, for guessing the 15-bit key generated by the
Trojan infected TRNG, needs to predict 5 consecutive times the
TRNG output (COUNT [6 : 4]). The power matrix P 4 gives
the attacker the transition probabilities 5 steps from the current
state of the TRNG output. However, the internal states between
current state (P 1 = P ) and the fifth state (P 4) of the TRNG
output are also important for the attacker. Assume the attacker
wants to find the probability with which TRNG generates
sequence 000, 000, 000, 000, 000. P 4 gives the probabilities
with which TRNG generates output value = 000 at step 5 when
its output value is 000 at step 1, independent of the output
values in steps 2, 3, and 4. The attacker wants to know the
probability that the intermediate output values (steps 2, 3, and
4) are 000 too. To solve this problem, we modify the transition
matrix P before computing P 4 in order to avoid counting se-
quences that contain unwanted intermediate states. Equation V
shows the modified P for sequence 000, 000, 000, 000, 000
in which we set to zero the probabilities of all unwanted
transitions that are incompatible with the desired sequence.
For example, transition from state 0000001 to state 1111111
corresponds to COUNT [6 : 4] = 000 being followed by
COUNT [6 : 4] = 111 which is incompatible with the target
sequence, so we set the transition probability to zero so that
it won’t be counted. As can be seen in this figure, only a
block of size 16× 16 remains as non-zero; this 16× 16 block
denotes the probabilities of all possible transitions from states
000xxxx to states 000xxxx where x ∈ {0, 1}. After obtaining
the modified transition matrix P ′, we compute P ′
4
which
includes the probabilities of four transitions from the current
state.
P ′ =
0000000 0000001 . . . 0001111 0010000 . . . 1111111

0000000 0.136 0.341 . . . 0.000 0.000 . . . 0.000
0000001 0.021 0.136 . . . 0.000 0.000 . . . 0.000
...
...
...
. . .
... 0.000
. . . 0.000
0001111 0.000 0.000 . . . 0.136 0.000 . . . 0.000
0010000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . . . 0.000
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
1111111 0.000 0.000 . . . 0.000 0.000 . . . 0.000
128∗128
Consider u as the probability vector which represents the
initial state of a Markov chain, then the ith component of u
represents the probability that the chain starts in state si. For
our Trojan infected TRNG we assume all initial states are
equally likely to occur. The following vector represents the
initial state of our manipulated TRNG in which the probability
that the chain starts in any state is
1
128
.
u = [
1
128
1
128
1
128
...
1
128
1
128
]1×128 (2)
The probability that the chain is in state si after n steps is
the ith entry in the following vector:
u(n) = uPn (3)
To obtain the probability of the sequence
000, 000, 000, 000, 000 we set n = 4 in the Equation 3
and then add all non-zero probabilities as shown in
Equations 4 and 5. The obtained value is almost equal to the
measured value in our experiment.
u(4) = uP ′4 = [
1
128
1
128
1
128
...
1
128
1
128
]P ′4 (4)
P (000, 000, 000, 000, 000) =
i=128∑
i=0
uP ′4[i] = 0.0764 (5)
An attacker can use this method to obtain the most likely
patterns for an n-bit key. Table I lists the eight most likely
patterns of a 15-bit key and their probabilities. The attacker
can guess the 15-bit key with the probability of 0.61 by trying
these eight patterns.
TABLE I: Most likely 15-bit patterns
15-bit Pattern Probability
000000000000000 0.0764
001001001001001 0.0764
010010010010010 0.0764
011011011011011 0.0764
100100100100100 0.0764
101101101101101 0.0764
110110110110110 0.0764
111111111111111 0.0764
VI. PRACTICAL RESULTS
45nm Nangate Open Cell Library is used for our implemen-
tation of the Trojan free and Trojan infected TRNGs.
The randomness of the Trojan free TRNG and the Trojan
infected TRNG are evaluated by the NIST statistical test suite
[1]. The Trojan free TRNG is robust and passes all NIST
tests across all temperatures (25◦C, 60◦C, 120◦C) as shown
in Table II. The NIST test suite results of the Trojan infected
TRNG are also shown in this table for different temperatures
(25◦C, 60◦C, 120◦C). The Trojan infected TRNG passes the
tests at the normal environmental temperatures (25◦C, 60◦C),
but at the trigger temperature of 120◦C does not pass the tests.
TABLE II: NIST test suite results for Trojan free and Trojan
infected TRNG
NIST Trojan free design Trojan infected design25◦C 60◦C 120◦C 25◦C 60◦C 120◦C
Frequency pass pass pass pass pass pass
Block frequency pass pass pass pass pass fail
Cumulative sums (1) pass pass pass pass pass fail
Cumulative sums (2) pass pass pass pass pass pass
Longest runs pass pass pass pass pass pass
FFT pass pass pass pass pass fail
Approximate entropy pass pass pass pass pass fail
The measured distribution of number of cycles to collapse
of the Trojan infected 3-edge RO at different environmental
temperatures are shown in Figure 7 which follows inverse
Gaussian distribution. Increasing the temperature causes the
mean and variance of the number of cycles to collapse to
decrease. At 120◦C the mean value becomes 0 with negligible
variance, meaning that the Trojan infected TRNG collapses
within the first few cycles and therefore does not provide
enough entropy.
Fig. 7: Distribution of 3-edge RO cycles to collapse at different
environmental temperatures
Figure 8 illustrates the Trojan free TRNG bitstream and also
the Trojan infected TRNG bitstream, raster scanning top-to-
bottom then left-to-right. The outputs of the Trojan-free TRNG
do not have any apparent pattern (Figure 8(a)), while the
outputs of the Trojan infected TRNG at the trigger temperature
are clearly periodic and non-random (Figure 8(b)). As another
view of the same data, the output values of the Trojan-free
TRNG for 600 samples (1800 bits) are shown in Figure 9(a),
and the output values of the Trojan infected TRNG are shown
in Figure 9(b). The Trojan infected TRNG produces output
patterns that are largely periodic but have some noise.
(a) Trojan free TRNG
(b) Trojan infected TRNG
Fig. 8: Output patterns of (a) the Trojan free TRNG, and (b)
the Trojan infected TRNG, raster scanning left-to-right then
top-to-bottom.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 9: Output values of (a) Trojan free TRNG and (b) Trojan
infected TRNG at 120◦C.
Table III reports the attack complexities of 64-bit, 128-bit,
and 256-bit keys for two probability values. There is a trade off
between the attack complexity and the probability of success,
but as can be seen in the table, for lower attack complexities
of each key size, the probability of success is still high and
acceptable.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We show how a parametric hardware Trojan with very low
overhead can be inserted into RO-based TRNG designs. This
TABLE III: Attack complexities of different key sizes
Attack Complexity Probability of success
64-bit 2
15 0.8928
218 0.996
128-bit 2
25 0.85
229 0.98
256-bit 2
55 0.964
258 0.9872
kind of parametric Trojan is very hard to be detected, because
in general it does not require the addition or removal of any
logic into or from the target design. Thus, even in a white-
box scenario the Trojan remains stealthy and is unlikely to
be detected by an evaluation lab. The underlying concept is
based on removing source of entropy of the TRNG when
Trojan is triggered in high temperature, while the malicious
TRNG works correctly and generate random outputs in normal
conditions. To inject the Trojan, we lengthen the certain path
of a combinatorial logic realizing RO in such a way that by
increasing temperature the source of entropy is not enough
anymore. We elaborate a stochastic model based on Markov
Chain for the attacker’s knowledge to predict the output of the
Trojan infected TRNG. This parametric Trojan allows us to
significantly lower the security level even of highly protected
crypto-core implementations that are connected to the TRNG.
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